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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

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RULE 58 - PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

 

It is settled that these injunctive reliefs are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests. Injunction is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. When the act sought to be enjoined ha[s] become fait accompli, only the prayer for provisional remedy should be denied. However, the trial court should still proceed with the determination of the principal action so that an adjudication of the rights of the parties can be had."

As earlier adverted to, the issue of damages remains unresolved. In Philippine National Bank v. CA,26 [291 SCRA 271, 277, June 26, 1998, per Bellosillo, J.] we said:

"In the instant case, aside from the principal action for damages, private respondent sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the foreclosure sale in order to prevent an alleged irreparable injury to private respondent. It is settled that these injunctive reliefs are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests. Injunction is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. When the act sought to be enjoined ha[s] become fait accompli, only the prayer for provisional remedy should be denied. However, the trial court should still proceed with the determination of the principal action so that an adjudication of the rights of the parties can be had."

In injunctive matters, even the cases cited by petitioners recognize the principle allowing lower courts judicial discretion, the exercise of which should not be interfered with except where there is manifest abuse.30 [See Government Service Insurance System v. Florendo, 178 SCRA 76, 89, September 29, 1989; Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. CA, 162 SCRA 165, 168, June 16, 1988.] There is no reason to disturb such exercise here.

Justice Panganiban, Third Division, Ticzon, Plana and Post v. Video Post Manila, Inc., [G.R. No. 136342. June 15, 2000]

 

 

Grounds for the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction

assignment of errors raises a single question: whether, in issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering private respondent to allow petitioner to undertake excavations along the access road for the purpose of installing water pipes, the Regional Trial Court gravely abused its discretion.

As held in Pelejo v. Court of Appeals, 18 [117 SCRA 665 (1982).] to justify the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction the following must be shown: (1) that the complainant has a clear legal right; (2) that his right has been violated and the invasion is material and substantial; and (3) that there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

The right of the complainant must be clear and unmistakable because, unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act or acts  19 [1964 Rules of Court, Rule 58, Section 1 is substantially the same as Rule 58, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure] and thus tends to do more than maintain the status quo. 20 [Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company v. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. 433 (1912); Bautista v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 1078 (1957).] In the case at bar, petitioner anchors its alleged right to the preliminary mandatory injunction on the Memorandum of Undertaking, dated September 18, 1987, which provides that:

(T)he above-described lot, being an existing private road, will remain open to ingress and egress for whatever kind of passage in favor of PROSPERITY FINANCIAL RESOURCES, INC. or its successors-in-interest.

There is no question as to the meaning of the terms "ingress" and "egress." They give petitioner the right to use the private road as a means of entry into and exit from its property on the northwestern side of the compound. The question concerns the meaning of the phrase "for whatever kind of passage." The trial court read this phrase to mean that petitioner had the right to make excavations on the side of the access road in order to install a network of water pipes. The word "passage" does not, however, "clearly and unmistakably" convey a meaning that includes a right to install water pipes on the access road. The ordinary meaning of the word, as defined in Websterís Dictionary, is that it is "the act or action of passing: movement or transference from one place or point to another." 21 [Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1650 (3rd ed., 1993).] Its legal meaning is not different. It means, according to Blackís Law Dictionary, the "act of passing; transit; transition." 22 [Blackís Law Dictionary 1012 (5th ed., 1979).] To achieve a meaning such as that which petitioner proposes requires the consideration of evidence showing the partiesí intention in using the word which can only be done during trial on the merits. Until such time, petitioner cannot claim to have a "clear and unmistakable" right justifying the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in this case. Thus, the trial court should have observed caution and denied petitionerís application for the preliminary writ.

Petitioner contends that resort should be made to facts surrounding the execution of the Memorandum of Undertaking which, according to it, shows the intention of the parties to give petitioner the right to install water pipes along the side of the access road. 23 [Petition, Rollo, pp. 29-32.] It cites Rule 130, Section11 24 [Now Rule 130, Section 13 of the Revised Rules On Evidence.] of the 1964 Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC.11. Interpretation according to circumstances. - For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret.

That is precisely what we are saying. The recourse petitioner proposes must await the presentation of the partiesí evidence during trial and the determination of their intention must be made by the trial court, not by this Court. Petitioner cannot circumvent the process by asking this Court to determine the facts surrounding the execution of their agreement. Indeed, for us to undertake such inquiry would be to expand the scope of the present review and intrude into the domain of the trial court. Petitioner will have ample opportunity to substantiate its allegations on this point during the trial of the case. Rule 130, Section 11, which petitioner invokes, is actually a rule for interpretation of documentary evidence formally offered at the trial. It does not apply to preliminary proceedings concerning the issuance of ancillary remedies.

Anent petitionerís contention that the writ of certiorari does not lie because the error sought to be corrected is an error of judgment, suffice it to say that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction despite the doubt on petitionerís right to it.

Justice Mendoza, Second Division, PROSPERITY CREDIT RESOURCES, INC., Petitioner vs. , COURT OF APPEALS AND METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC., Respondents, G. R. No. 114170, January 15, 1999  

 

 

 

 
Preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy intended to provide protection to parties for the preservation of their rights or interests during the pendency of the principal action. Conversely, if an action, by its nature, does not require such protection or preservation, the remedy is unavailing and the relief sought cannot be granted.

Preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy intended to provide protection to parties for the preservation of their rights or interests during the pendency of the principal action. Conversely, if an action, by its nature, does not require such protection or preservation, the remedy is unavailing and the relief sought cannot be granted. 6 [3 Manuel V. Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 80 (1997)]

In this case, EMRO sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in connection with a petition for declaratory relief wherein the court is asked "to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a determination of [the partyís] rights and duties thereunder." 7 [Rule 64, ß1.] Indeed, beyond the adjudication of legal rights which are the subject of controversy between the parties, the court cannot issue in such cases an order of injunction, execution or similar reliefs, 8 [Moran, supra at 203.] for the simple reason that no right of petitioner has yet been violated.

Put in another way, a party cannot act, then ask the courts to declare that its action was not a violation of its agreement with another person and, at the same time, seek to enjoin the other party from revoking or cancelling their agreement. In this case, EMROís doubts and fears cannot give rise to a cause of action to prevent the mere possibility that its lease contract with the government will be cancelled or revoked.  

Petitioners also question the writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that it was issued in violation of ß1 of P.D. No. 605, which provides:

No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or preliminary injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines.

The trial court rejected petitionersí contention on the ground that the issue "is not the legality of the execution of the Foreshore Lease Contract but rather the propriety and legality of the [governmentís] threatened act of infringing or nullifying the rights of [EMRO] under the contract by way of causing its cancellation or revocation on account of alleged violation of the terms thereof. . . ." The court cited the ruling in Datiles and Company v. Sucaldito,13 [186 SCRA 704, 712 (1990)] where it was stated:

[The] prohibition dictated by PD No. 605 . . . pertains to the issuance by courts of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts on controversies which involve facts or exercise of discretion in technical cases, because to allow courts to judge these matters could disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. But on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts are not prevented by PD No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.

At this stage, there is really no need to determine whether ß1 of P.D. No. 605 applies. This provision covers situations where a definite act has been undertaken or is being performed by administrative officials. As already stated, the issuance of an injunctive order in this case is premature.

Justice Mendoza, Second Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JEREMIAS DOLINO, in his capacity as Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Region VII Office, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ISAIAS P. DICDICAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 11, RTC, Cebu City, and EMRO INTERNATIONAL, INC., respondents. [G.R. No. 128010. February 28, 2000]  

 

20-day lifetime of a restraining order is non-extendible. The court is without discretion to extend such period considering the mandatory tenor of the Rule.

With respect to the validity of the restraining order issued on June 14, 1985 and the trial courtís directive enjoining the parties to maintain the status quo ante litem, petitioner contends that these are contrary to P.D. 385 41 [This decree requires government financial institutions to foreclose mandatorily all loans with arrearages, including interest and charges, amounting to at least twenty percent (20%) of the total outstanding obligation. Sec. 2 thereof provides that "(n)o restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued by the court against any government financial institution in any action taken by such institution in compliance with the mandatory foreclosure provided in Section 1 hereof, whether such restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction is sought by the borrower(s) or any third party or parties, except after due hearing in which it is established by the borrower and admitted by the government financial institution concerned that twenty percent (20%) of the outstanding arrearages has been paid after the filing of foreclosure proceedings."] and Sec. 5, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, as amended by B.P. Blg. 224,42 [As amended by B.P. Blg. 224, Sec. 5 of Rule 58 now reads:

"SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; issuance of restraining order.-No preliminary injunction shall be granted without notice to the defendant. If it is shall appear from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified complaint that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the judge to whom the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty days from date of its issuance. Within the said twenty-day period, the judge must cause an order to be served on the defendant, requiring him to show cause at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted, and determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and shall accordingly issue the corresponding order. In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied the restraining order is deemed automatically vacated.]

Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair, affect or modify in any way any rights granted by, or rules pertaining to injunctions contained in, existing agrarian, labor or social legislation."] as well as this Courtís Circular No. 13 dated May 17, 1984.43 [This circular enjoins Justices of the then Intermediate Appellate Court and the judges of lower courts to strictly comply with the provisions of P.D. No. 385, P.D. 1818 and B.P. Blg. 224.]

That issue has been mooted by the invalidity of the order admitting the supplemental complaint. "A temporary restraining order is merely an ancillary process to an action owing its existence entirely and exclusively from the latter. It cannot survive the main case which it was but an incident."44 [Roldan, Jr. v. Arca, L-25434, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 336, 344 and National Sugar Workers Union v. La Carlota Sugar Central, L-23569, May 25, 1972, 45 SCRA 104, 109.]

It should be stressed, moreover, that P.D. 385 should only be invoked after the factual basis for its application has been laid through the presentation of evidence in a trial on the merits. It cannot be applied automatically.45 [Sps. Almeda v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 309, 323-325 (1996) citing Filipinas Marble Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68010, May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 180 and Republic Planters Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95249, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 402.] It is noteworthy, too, that the TRO was issued on June 14, 1985, the same day the motion to admit the supplemental pleading was filed, while the directive to maintain the status quo ante litem was incorporated in the order of August 20, 1985 or more than two (2) months after the issuance of the restraining order. By force of law, the TRO expired on the 20th day after notice of the June 14, 1985 TRO. It is evident therefore that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in extending the lifetime of the restraining order that had in the meantime expired, by issuing another order in violation of B.P. Blg. 224. As such, the second order of August 20, 1985 as far as it ordered the return to the status quo ante litem is concerned, is a "patent nullity"46 [Cabungco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78265, January 22, 1990, 181 SCRA 313, 315.] because the 20-day lifetime of a restraining order is non-extendible.47 [Golangco v. Judge Villanueva, 343 Phil. 937, 946 (1997).] The court is without discretion to extend such period considering the mandatory tenor of the Rule.48 [Federation of Land Reform Farmers of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 316 Phil. 226, 234 (1995).]

Justice Purisima, Third Division, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 148, STA. INES MELALE FOREST PRODUCTS CORPORATION, RODOLFO M. CUENCA and MANUEL I. TINIO, respondents. [G.R. No. 81024. February 3, 2000]  

 

the Rules of Court do not require that issues be joined before preliminary injunction may issue.  Preliminary injunction may be  granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, ordering a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. For as long as the requisites for its issuance are present in the case, such issuance is valid.

Furthermore, contrary to petitionerís contention, the Rules of Court do not require that issues be joined before preliminary injunction may issue.  Preliminary injunction may be  granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, ordering a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. 1 [Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 771 (1997). ] For as long as the requisites for its issuance are present in the case, such issuance is valid.

xxx

Petitionerís contention that the writ of injunction issued by the trial court effectively adjudicated ownership of the mortgaged property in favor of  respondent Blanquita Ang is misplaced.  It is only upon expiration of the redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of his right of redemption, that ownership of the land sold in a foreclosure sale becomes consolidated in the purchaser. 2 [ Oronce v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 133 (1998).] The probate court issued the writ to enjoin petitioner and other concerned parties from performing any act which would directly or indirectly enforce the effects of the extra-judicial foreclosure of decedentís property caused by petitioner bank, in order to preserve the estate of the decedent. Consolidation of title would have the consequence of transferring ownership since the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. 3 [Unionbank v. Court of Appeals, 311 SCRA 795 (1999)] Therefore, at the time the writ was issued there was yet no issue regarding ownership because the period for redemption had not lapsed.

Nevertheless, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings, but such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. 3 [ Vizconde v. Court of Appeals,  286 SCRA 217 (1998), citing Pastor, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 207 Phil. 758 (1983).] Thus, the allegations of Blanquita Ang that her signatures on the real estate mortgage documents were forged may be ventilated in a separate proceeding, requiring the presentation of clear and convincing evidence. 

Petitioner asserts that the writ may not issue because of the prior issuance of a temporary restraining order by the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals, however, later on withdrew its temporary restraining order and sustained the injunction issued by the trial court.  The grant or denial of an injunction rests in the sound discretion of the court. [OrtaŮez-Enderes v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 128525, December 17, 1999.] Considering that there were factual reasons necessitating the issuance of the writ, we find that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the issuance of an injunction.

Justice Pardo, First Division, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE NICASIO O. DE LOS REYES, Presiding Judge,  Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 11, MARIA LETBEE ANG, BLANQUITA ANG, LETICIA L. ANG HERNANDEZ, JESUS L. ANG, JR., LORETA L. ANG, BONIFACIO L. ANG, LORENA L. ANG, LANI L. ANG, JEMMUEL L. ANG and LIZA L. ANG, respondents,   [G.R. No. 103149.  November 15 , 2000]

 

 

The remedy of injunction could no longer be availed of where the act to be prevented had long been consummated. Administrative decisions on matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. Absent these badges of executive excesses, no injunction may be granted.

The remedy of injunction could no longer be availed of where the act to be prevented had long been consummated. Administrative decisions on matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. Absent these badges of executive excesses, no injunction may be granted.

As a rule, injunction is not granted to take property out of the possesssion or control of one party to be placed into that of another whose title has not clearly established by law. For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is  an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The remedy of injunction could no longer be availed of where the act to be prevented had long been consummated.

Court cannot enjoin an agency from performing an act within its prerogative, except when in the exercise of its authority it gravely abused or exceeded its jurisdiction. Administrative decisions on matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. Absent these badges of executive excesses, no injunction may be granted.

Justice Quisumbing, Second Division, Zabat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122089, August 23, 2000.

 

At any rate, pursuant to Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure, the decision of the RTC affirming the decision of the MTCC has become immediately executory, without prejudice to the appeal before the Court of Appeals. The said Section repealed Section 10 of the Rules of Court allowing during the pendency of the appeal with the Court of Appeals a stay of execution of the RTC judgment with respect to the restoration of possession where the defendant makes a periodic deposit of rentals. Thus, immediate execution of the judgment becomes a ministerial duty of the court. No new writ of execution was, however, issued. Nevertheless, the writ of demolition thereafter issued was sufficient to constitute a writ of execution, as it substantially complied with the form and contents of a writ of execution as provided for under Section 8 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, private respondents were duly notified and heard on the omnibus motion for the issuance of the writ of demolition and were given five days to remove their houses.14 [Rubio v. MTCC, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City, 252 SCRA 172, 181-182 [1996].]

Invoking Legaspi v. AvendaŮo,15 [Supra note 7.] the Court of Appeals held that there was an equitable reason to suspend the enforcement of the writ of execution and order of demolition until after the final determination of the civil case for the nullification of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale.

In Legaspi, this Court held:

Where the action ... is one of illegal detainer ... and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expense [f]or the court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership.

In the instant case, private respondentsí petition for review with prayer for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction was mailed on 2 August 1994 but was received by the Court of Appeals only on 30 August 1994. Meanwhile, on 3 August 1994, the writ of demolition was implemented, resulting in the demolition of private respondentsí houses. Hence, any relevant issue arising from the issuance or enforcement of the writ had been rendered moot and academic. Injunction would not lie anymore, as the acts sought to have been enjoined had already become a fait accompli or an accomplished or consummated act.

CJ Davide, First Division, Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. CA et al [G.R. No. 128102. March 7, 2000]  

 

A preliminary injunction issued in an action to enforce a contract, which prohibits an employee from working in a competing enterprise within two years from resignation, has the same lifetime as the prohibition -- two years also. Therefore, upon the expiration of the said period, a suit questioning the validity of the issuance of the writ becomes functus oficio and therefore moot. Courts are called upon to resolve actual cases and controversies, not to render advisory opinions. They cannot take cognizance of moot and academic questions, subject to notable exceptions involving constitutional issues.

Justice Panganiban, Third Division, Ticzon, Plana and Post v. Video Post Manila, Inc., [G.R. No. 136342. June 15, 2000]

 

 

An injunction to prohibit the issuance of writ of possession is entirely out of place. Prohibition does not lie to enjoin the implementation of a writ of possession. Once the writ of possession has been issued, the trial court has no alternative but to enforce the writ without delay.

An injunction to prohibit the issuance of writ of possession is entirely out of place. In several cases,14 [Suico v. CA, 301 SCRA 212, 221 (1999); A.G. Development v. CA, 281 SCRA 155, 159 (1997); Navarra v. CA, 204 SCRA 805, 858 (1991)] the Court has ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function. "The order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. The judge issuing the order following these express provisions of law cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion."15 [GSIS v. CA, 169 SCRA 244, 256 (1989)] Therefore, the issuance of the writ of possession being ministerial in character, the implementation of such writ by the sheriff is likewise ministerial.

Contrary to petitionersí protestations that Veloso v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 205 SCRA 227 (1992) should only apply to cases wherein the one-year period for redemption has already lapsed, Veloso makes no such distinction. In said case, the Court merely observed that -

"Worthy of note is that petitioners do not impugn the validity of the mortgage at its inception. Their assault is on it is founded on events allegedly transpiring after its execution. The tenability of their challenge to the mortgage may well be determined in the civil action (No. 136559) instituted by them in the Manila Regional Trial Court. But clearly, the pendency of that action does not and cannot bar the issuance of a writ of possession to the mortgagee who has, in the meantime, extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and acquired it as highest bidder in the subsequent public auction sale. The law is quite explicit on this point, and the right of the mortgagee thereunder unquestionable. And decisions abound applying the law and declaring it to be the courtís ministerial duty to uphold the mortgageeís right to possession even during the redemption period."16 [Veloso at 234.]

As a rule, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession.17 [Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 146, 149 (1994); Navarra v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 850 (1991); De Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 294, 302 (1990)] Regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of said case. Hence, an injunction to prohibit the issuance of writ of possession is entirely out of place. 18 [Kho v. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 160, 164 (1991)]

First. Under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, prohibition can only be availed of if there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, appeal under Sec. 8 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, is still available. Further, petitioners have a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which is their separate case for annulment of the foreclosure of mortgage.

Second. Prohibition does not lie to enjoin the implementation of a writ of possession.

In PNB v. Adil, 118 SCRA 116 (1982), the Court held that "once the writ of possession has been issued, the trial court has no alternative but to enforce the writ without delay." The Court found it gross error for the judge to have suspended the implementation of the writ of possession on a very dubious ground as "humanitarian reason."

Justice Quisumbing, Second Division, Spouses Ong  v. Court of Appeals, Judge Bonifacio, Provincial Sheriff Belvis and Deputy Sheriff Sta. Ana and Premiere Devt Bank.[G.R. No. 121494. June 8, 2000]  

 

 

Moreover, in denying petitioner's petition for injunction, the court a quo is merely upholding the time-honored principle that a Regional Trial Court, being a co-equal body of the National Labor Relations Commission, has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of any decision of the latter.

 

Moreover, in denying petitioner's petition for injunction, the court a quo is merely upholding the time-honored principle that a Regional Trial Court, being a co-equal body of the National Labor Relations Commission, has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of any decision of the latter.27 [New Pangasinan Review, Inc. v. NLRC, 196 SCRA 56, 66 (1991).]Jurisš

Justice Quisumbing, Second Division, Delta Ventures Resources, Inc. v. Hon. Cabato Et al., [G.R. No. 118216. March 9, 2000]  

 

 

This contention has no merit. It is a basic procedural postulate that a preliminary injunction which necessarily includes a temporary restraining order should never be used to transfer the possession or control of a thing to a party who did not have such possession or control at the inception of the case.

This contention has no merit. It is a basic procedural postulate that a preliminary injunction which necessarily includes a temporary restraining order should never be used to transfer the possession or control of a thing to a party who did not have such possession or control at the inception of the case.12 [Central Bank v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 59957, 12 November 1990, 191 SCRA 346.] The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 4 September 1987 merely restrained respondent STA. CLARA and all its agents and representatives from withdrawing and disposing of the plywood inventory in STA. CLARAís plant or warehouse until further orders from this Court.13 [Records, p. 73.] The order did not contain any directive whatsoever to any of the petitioners to seize property belonging to STA. CLARA or to keep the property seized in their possession. The petitioners, by what they did, took the law into their own hands without any specific order from this Court; hence, the seizure made by them on 26 October 1987 was void and illegal even if the intention of petitioners was to prevent the alleged violation of the temporary restraining order. Any violation of the injunction or temporary restraining order which is in full force or effect constitutes contempt of court and is punishable as such, and the remedy of the aggrieved party is to institute contempt proceedings where the court in appropriate cases may punish the violator for the purpose of preserving and enforcing the rights of the persons for whose protection the injunction or restraining order was granted. Clearly, with the subsequent lifting of the temporary restraining order the subject crates of plywood seized by petitioners devoid of legal authority were never placed at any time under custodia legis that would prevent private respondents from recovering their possession over the same. The amount of damages directed by the trial court to be paid to private respondents by petitioners arising from the wrongful taking of the property is a factual matters binding and conclusive upon this Court.

Justice Belosillo, Second Division, Velasco et al., v. CA et al [G.R. No. 121517. March 31, 2000]

 

 

To be entitled to the injunctive writ, they must show that there exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. 

To be entitled to the injunctive writ, they must show that there exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. 16 [Searth Commodities Corporation v. CA, 207 SCRA 628 [March 31, 1992]; Saulog v. CA, G.R. No. 119769, September 18, 1996.]

 Furthermore, there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
17 [Syndicated Media Access Corporation v. CA, 219 SCRA 797 [March 11, 1993].]

Complainant's right must be clear and unmistakable. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.
18 [Arcega v. CA, G. R. No. 122206, July 7, 1997 citing Vinzons-Chato v. Natividad, 244 SCRA 787 and China Banking Corporation v. CA, G. R. No. 121158, December 5, 1996.]

The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction
19 [Ibid. citing Ulang v. CA, 224 SCRA 642.]

In the instant case, the enforcement of the writ of execution, which would evict them from their homes, is manifestly prejudicial to petitioners' interest. However, they possess no clear legal right that merits the protection of the courts through the writ of preliminary injunction. Their right to possess the property in question has been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to the plaintiff in the ejectment case below after a judgment which has become final and executory.

Petitioner' ground for the issuance of the writ of prohibition and/or certiorari before the Court of Appeals is the presence of a supervening event that renders execution unjust or inequitable. Said issue remains unresolved in the main case still pending and does not confirm the existence of a clear right in favor of petitioners. At best, they can obtain the suspension of the enforcement of the writ of execution or other similar relief on equitable grounds. 20 [When a judgment or order becomes final and executory, the trial court's ministerial duty is to issue a writ of execution to enforce this judgment. A writ of execution may, however, be refused on equitable grounds such as when there is a change in situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable. Likewise, where supervening events occurring subsequent to the judgment bring about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances, a stay or preclusion of execution may be properly sought. These are cases of special and exceptional nature where execution may be suspended in the higher interest of justice. Baclayon v. CA, 182 SCRA 761 [February 26, 1990]; Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, 247 SCRA 528 [August 23, 1995] citing Luna v. CA, 137 SCRA 7; Heirs of Gumimpin v. CA, 120 SCRA 687; Albar v. Carandang, 6 SCRA 211. Hualam Construction Development Corporation v. CA, 214 SCRA 612 [October 16, 1992] citing Laurel v. Abalos, 163 SCRA 237; Laurel v. Abalos, 30 SCRA 281 [October 31, 1969]; Concurring opinion of Chief Justice, then Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Baclayon v. CA, 182 SCRA 761 [February 26, 1990]; and Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, 163 SCRA 237 [June 30, 1988]; Lipana v. Development Bank of Rizal, 154 SCRA 257 [September 24, 1987] citing Vecino v. Geronimo, 59 O. G. 579.]

VICTORIA MEDINA, VIRGINIA VINUYA, ANSELMO YABOT and SALVACION MENDOZA, Petitioners vs. CITY SHERIFF, MANILA and SPOUSES JUSTINO V. JIMENEZ and AURORA RUEDA JIMENEZ, Respondents, G. R. No. 113235, July 24, 1997 per Justice Romero, Second Division

 

The issues for our determination are: Was the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction proper?  Was there grave abuse of discretion committed by the Court of Appeals when it set aside the order of the trial court, then issued a judgment touching on the merits?

Petitioner avers that the CA erred in issuing a preliminary injunction in private respondentís favor.  He says, firstly, that he is more entitled to it.  He states that as holder of the Certificate of Copyright Registration of the twin-dragon design, he has the protection of P.D. No. 49.1 [PD 49, Chapter I, Sec. 2.  The rights granted by this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with respect to any of the following classes of works:

x x x

(o) Prints, pictorial, illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags, and box wraps. 

Chapter II, Article VI, Sec. 28.  Any person infringing a copyright shall be liable:

(a) To an injunction restraining such infringement.]

Said law allows an injunction in case of infringement. Petitioner asserts that private respondent has no registered copyright and merely relies on the trademark of his principal abroad, which insofar as Philippine laws is concerned, cannot prevail over the petitionerís copyright.

Private respondent, for his part, avers that petitioner has no ďclear rightĒ over the use of the copyrighted wrapper since the PAGODA trademark and label were first adopted and used and have been duly registered by Ceroilfood Shandong not only in China but in nearly 20 countries and regions worldwide. Petitioner was not the original creator of the label, but merely copied the design of Ceroilfood Shandong.  Private respondent presented copies of the certificates of copyright registration in the name of Ceroilfood Shandong issued by at least twenty countries and regions worldwide which although unauthenticated are, according to him, sufficient to provide a sampling of the evidence needed in the determination of the grant of preliminary injunction.  2 [Syndicated Media Access Corporation, et al. vs. CA, et al., 219 SCRA 794, 798 (1993). Private respondent alleges, that the trademark PAGODA BRAND was registered in China on October 31, 1979 3 [CA Rollo, p. 51. while the trademark LUNGKOW VERMICELLI WITH TWO-DRAGON DEVICE was registered on August 15, 1985. 4 [Ibid.]

To resolve this controversy, we have to return to basics.  A person to be entitled to a copyright must be the original creator of the work.  He must have created it by his own skill, labor and judgment without directly copying or evasively imitating the work of another. 5 [Hoffman vs. Le Traunik, 209 Federal Reporter 375, 379.] The grant of preliminary injunction in a case rests on the sound discretion of the court with the caveat that it should be made with extreme caution. 6 [Bataclan vs. CA, et al., 175 SCRA 764, 770 (1989). Its grant depends chiefly on the extent of doubt on the validity of the copyright, existence of infringement, and the damages sustained by such infringement. 7 [18 CJS 241, citing Boosey vs. Empire Music Co., 224 F 646 and Sweet vs. Bromley, 154 F 754.] In our view, the copies of the certificates of copyright registered in the name of Ceroilfood Shandong sufficiently raise reasonable doubt.  With such a doubt, the preliminary injunction is unavailing. 8 [18 CJS 242.  In Medina vs. City Sheriff, Manila, 276 SCRA 133, 139 (1997), where the complainantís title was disputed, we held that injunction was not proper.

xxx

To be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. 9 [Arcega vs. CA, et al., 275 SCRA 176, 180 (1997). From the above discussion, we find that petitionerís right has not been clearly and unmistakably demonstrated.  That right is what is in dispute and has yet to be determined. In Developers Group of Companies, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 715, 722-723 (1993), we held that in the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order of the trial court granting the issuance of an injunctive writ will be set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Conformably, there was no abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals when it issued its own order to restrain the enforcement of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.

Justice Quisumbing, Second Division, WILSON ONG CHING KIAN CHUAN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LORENZO TAN, respondents. [G.R. No. 130360.  August 15, 2001]

 

 

 

A co-lessee or sub-lessee of the property  is still bound by the ejectment suit even if it was not named a party thereto. Hence an injunction will not lie.

Moreover, petitioner admits that it has been the actual occupant of the leased premises since 1980 and it has authorized Constancio Manzano to pay the rents for and in its behalf. In fact, it claims to have been paying the rent religiously, effectively implying that it is a co-lessee or sub-lessee of the property. Thus, it is still bound by the ejectment suit even if it was not named a party thereto.6 [Bataclan v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 764 (1989)] It is well-settled that a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding not only upon the defendants in the suit but also against those not made parties thereto, if they are:

a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently
Öoccupying the property to frustrate the judgment;
b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendant;
c) transferees pendente lite;
d) sublessee;
e) co-lessee; or
f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant.
7 [1 Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 793 (1997)]

Consequently, the appellate court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the trial courtís order granting the writ of preliminary injunction.

The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as such, it cannot by itself be subject of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. 8 [Saulog v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 590 (1996); Arabesque Industrial Philippines, Inc. v. court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 602 (1992)] The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. 9 [Salcedo-OrtaŮez v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 111 (1994)] In the instant case, the trial court issued as writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 13040, in spite of the fact that the right of petitioner to occupy the leased premises has been declared by final judgment to be inexistent. Having no clear legal right, petitionerís plea should not have merited the favorable action of the trial court. The order granting the writ of preliminary injunction was thus clearly erroneous and must be set aside. As the appellate court succintly explained:

We are mindful of the ruling of the Supreme Court that where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the orders or decisions pertaining to the cause are orders or decisions within its jurisdiction and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. However, while certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court, the Supreme Court allows certiorari as a mode of redress where the assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. Petitioner would be made to suffer unnecessary waste of time before it could proceed with the ejectment of its lessees and all persons, including private respondent Oro Cam claiming under them if we opt to dismiss the petition and ignore the patently erroneous granting of the writ of preliminary injunciton and unduly impose upon petitioner the burden of going through the proceedings with respondent court which had evidently taken a patently erroneous view against herein petitionerís valid stand.10 [CA Decision, p. 9; Rollo, p. 29.]

Justice Mendoza, Second Division, ORO CAM ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, former Fourth Division and ANGEL CHAVES, INC., respondents [G.R. No. 128743. November 29, 1999]

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